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Abstract
This paper aims to examine the extent of goodwill impairment in listed companies of
China and the audited disclosure of goodwill. China is an important adopter of
International Financial Standards but the question remains that, as a recent adopter, to
what extent contentious issues such as goodwill impairment are implemented. The
research analyzes the financial and share market information gathered from the top 50
companies listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. The findings reveal that goodwill
amortization has been discontinued and replaced by goodwill impairment, but
interestingly the Big Four firms seem more likely to recognize a goodwill impairment loss
than smaller, local audit firms. This would imply that the Big Four Western audit firms
with a plethora of clients are less likely to be intimidated by Chinese managers into
ignoring impairment than small local firms, which may be more dependent on these large
Chinese corporations for their existence. However, findings indicate that negative
financial and share market information show some correlation with goodwill impairment
where impairment occurs. The most significant finding is that the analysis reveals that
there remains a wider problem with adequate disclosure in the notes to the accounts as to
whether and why goodwill should be impaired or not.
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Introduction
The financial crisis has affected the world’s economies and produced significant effects on
financial reporting in the last ten years (Laghi, Mattei, & Marcantonio, 2013). The “real value”
of goodwill shown in the financial statements of listed companies has been one of the most
controversial issues for the investors and analysts.
The International Financial Reporting Standards 3 (IFRS 3), Business Combinations provides
specific guidelines on how to measure and recognize goodwill at acquisition date. The
International Accounting Standards (IAS 38 & 36), also stipulate that goodwill should not be
amortized. Instead, such assets should be tested for impairment annually or more frequently if
events or changes in circumstances indicate a decline in value. The increasing demand for
transparency and comparability from global business has made the convergence of accounting
standards an irresistible historical trend, especially in China, which is now one of the world’s
major business drivers. With regard to convergence, Zhang and Liu (2010) comment that the
issuance of a total of 38 new business accounting standards in China in 2006 has allowed
substantial convergence with IFRS. Although there are a few remaining differences, China is
working on all accounting standards being convergent with IFRS such as business related
parties.
With regard to the audit context of impairment, in late 2013, The Economist journal published
an article entitled “Goodwill Hunting” which reported a conspicuous lack of impairment
among public Indian companies and identified as a possible explanation “arm twisting” of
auditors by powerful company executives – especially subjecting smaller, local firms to
pressure (J. Wang & Hooper, 2014). To find out whether a similar situation exists in China,
this paper sets out to examine the write-down practices of the top 50 public companies listed
on the Shanghai exchange.
The aim of the paper is to conduct an empirical study with four main objectives. First, to
examine the extent of disclosure of accounting policies by the listed companies as to the fair
value of their goodwill. Second, to compare the goodwill treatment among companies audited
by Big Four firms and companies audited by local firms. Third, is to identify if there are any
companies that should have recognized any goodwill impairment and did not. Finally, to
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evaluate the extent of disclosure in the notes to the accounts as to whether or why there is
impairment or not.
The paper is structured as follows. First, there is a literature review that discusses the
amortization versus impairment argument, which is followed by a review of the usefulness of
the price-earnings ratio as a guide to possible impairment. Following the literature review, the
paper outlines the research questions and method with the overall theme of asking: what is the
case as to impairment in China? To fulfill this objective, three research questions are developed,
followed by a description of the method of the empirical investigation. Next, the findings are
identified from the study together with a discussion of the findings in relation to the research
questions. Finally, a conclusion and suggestions for future research are discussed.

Literature Review
Amortization versus Impairment
According to IAS 22 Business Combination (issued in 1993 and superseded by IFRS 3 in
2004), goodwill should be capitalized and amortized over its useful life, which should not
exceed five years unless a longer period of up to 20 years can be justified. However, this was
conceptually inconsistent with US practice, which amortizes goodwill up to 40 years
(Accounting Principles Board (APB) Opinion No.17). Later in 1998, IAS 22 was revised to
require goodwill to be capitalized and amortized, given a presumption of useful life of up to 20
years, followed by annual impairment tests if a life of over 20 years was used.
Based on the respondents to ED 3, Business Combinations (IASB 2002), amortization was
viewed as the only practical solution to the intractable problem on goodwill (IASB 2004d).
Although the useful life of goodwill could not be reliably measured and predicted at a
satisfactory level, it was a practical and well-established principle consistent with the
accounting treatment taken to other tangible and intangible assets with finite useful lives. It
also provided an appropriate balance between conceptual soundness and operationally at an
acceptable cost (Wiese, 2005).
However, amortization ignores the fact that some forms of goodwill can have an indefinite
useful life, or cannot be reliably measured and predicted at a satisfactory level. Thus, it
introduces some problems with regard to the relevance of financial reporting and its usefulness.
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It may be argued that amortization may cause alarm among users of financial statements
because it deducts from earnings and affects profits in subsequent periods(V. Wang, 2011).
Also, prior studies (Jennings, LeClere, & Thompson, 2001; Moehrle, Reynolds-Moehrle, &
Wallace, 2001) provide empirical evidence that systematic amortization of goodwill over an
arbitrary period does not provide useful information to the users of the financial statements.
Amortization may make it more difficult for investors to use the measure of earnings and to
predict future profitability. Moreover, goodwill does not necessarily wear out and that an
annual amortisation expense over an arbitrary life is a meaningless number. In 2001, the
Financial Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”) expressed its opinion that it is virtually
impossible to predict accurately the useful life of goodwill and amortisation of goodwill is not
a faithful representation of the true pattern of declining goodwill (FASB 2001b). Subsequently,
FASB published the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (“SFAS”) 142, which
prohibits the amortisation of goodwill. It requires instead annual impairment tests to reflect the
true and fair view of the assets values. The purpose of this accounting rule is to encourage
management to communicate privately held information about goodwill and provide
stakeholders with better quality information to assess the performance and future cash flows of
the company (AbuGhazaleh, Al-Hares, & Haddad, 2012; Kavcic, Jerman, & Kavcic, 2013; Li,
Shroff, Venkataraman, & Zhang, 2011).
To seek convergence and global harmonisation, the International Accounting Standards Board
(IASB) followed the FASB’s approach in 2004 by replacing IAS 22 with IFRS 3, thereby
converging with US GAAP. IFRS 3 states that from the beginning of the first annual period
beginning on or after 31 March 2004, all entities must discontinue amortising goodwill and
must test goodwill for impairment. In the same year, IASB issued IAS 36 Impairment of Assets,
which provided a two-step approach for goodwill impairment testing as follows.
Step 1: Compare the carrying amount of the unit, including the goodwill, with its recoverable
amount. The recoverable amount of such a unit should be measured, consistent with the
requirements in IAS 36, as the higher of value in use and net selling price. If the recoverable
amount of the unit exceeds its carrying amount, goodwill is not impaired. If not, then follow
Step 2.
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Step 2: Compare the implied value of goodwill with its carrying amount. Implied goodwill is
the excess of the recoverable amount of the unit to which the goodwill has been allocated over
the fair value of the net identifiable assets that the entity would recognise if it acquired that unit
in a business combination on the date of the impairment test. Any excess of the
amount of goodwill

over

carrying

its implied value is recognised immediately, in profit or

loss, as an impairment loss. Any remaining excess of the carrying amount of the unit over its
recoverable amount is recognised as an impairment loss and allocated to the other assets of the
unit on a pro rata basis, based on the carrying amount of each asset in the unit.
(V. Wang, 2011) found that the change from amortisation to impairment promotes and
improves the investors' understanding of the components of companies’ earnings and also
removes their confusions as to the relevance and usefulness of goodwill amortisation
information. Subsequently, amortization of goodwill in most listed companies in Anglo-Saxon
countries has been abandoned, and, in accordance with IFRS 3 there is testing for impairment
annually or whenever there is an indication that the goodwill may be impaired. Companies
must now recognise an impairment loss when the carrying amount exceeds the recoverable
amount (Kavcic et al., 2013).
However, goodwill impairment loss among companies may show some correlation with
performance and investor confidence (Li et al., 2011). First, the goodwill impairment may be
found to be a leading indicator of a decline in prospective sales and operating profits, and a
failure to realise the expected benefits from prior acquisitions. Second, overpayment for a prior
acquisition could be another potential contributing factor causing companies to deplete the
overpayment by impairment in subsequent periods. Third, the announcement of goodwill
impairment could influence investors and financial analysts to revise their expectations of
future company prospects.
The goodwill impairment approach is not without its problems. Firstly, the impairment test
may impose a significant cost on companies (Wiese, 2005). The valuation of goodwill is
complex and unlikely to be verifiable, thus specialized experts and valuation techniques are
often required for an impairment test (Kavcic et al., 2013). According to a survey conducted
by Grant Thornton & NASDAQ Stock Market, Inc., 71% of selected CFOs in the survey would
use “outside assistance” to perform the impairment test. Secondly, the impairment test may be
liable to manipulation. The impairment criteria provided by the standard are drafted in such a
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way as to leave significant room for managerial discretion, interpretation, judgment and bias
(Massoud & Raiborn, 2003). Companies may act opportunistically by using their greater
managerial reporting discretion to avoid reporting an impairment loss (Li et al., 2011).
Management may act for their self-interest at the expense of shareholders. Third, the
uncertainty and subjective judgments involved in impairment tests may affect the reliability of
the information provided by the disclosures demanded by users of financial statements to assess
future cash flow (Kavcic et al., 2013; V. Wang, 2011). Such uncertainty and subjectivity may
make it no less arbitrary than amortisation (Wiese, 2005). Lastly, there are possibilities for
companies to enhance their earnings per share by avoiding any impairment on goodwill. This
could deceive investors into believing that such companies are doing better than anticipated,
thus increasing and overvaluing their stock prices (Basi & Penning, 2002). For this reason The
Economist (2013) reports that managers may “twist the arms of auditors” to delay impairment.
Wang & Hooper (2014) found that there is even more inconsistency around disclosure of
impairment as nearly half of the top 50 companies analysed on the Bombay exchange fail to
mention any write down of goodwill. Some companies claim that they were testing for
impairment but no case of actual impairment was reported. This, in spite of some companies,
is reporting declining earnings and share price.
The accounting treatment of goodwill has been a long-standing issue of concern to accountants
and accounting standards committees for more than a decade. Both amortization and
impairment tests involve a certain degree of subjectivity, and have different drawbacks either
in implementation difficulties or theoretical support. There is no perfect solution to satisfy
everyone on the options of how to recognise a decline in the value of goodwill.
Although the impairment test is costly, time consuming and susceptible to manipulation, it is
arguably better approach for reflecting future prospects of investments and gives a true and fair
view of the business. It is worth noting that the IASB has recently decided to conduct a postimplementation review on IFRS 3, which introduces some possible solutions to address the
existing issues encountered. This includes improving the existing impairment test rules and
disclosure requirements (IAS 36) and possibly reintroducing goodwill amortisation in addition
to the impairment test (Laghi et al., 2013).

Price earnings ratio
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The price-earnings ratio (the “PE ratio”) is one of the investment ratios used by investors for
performance analysis of listed companies. As it measures trends, it may also have some bearing
on whether a company’s goodwill should be impaired. It is calculated by using the current share
price divided by the earnings per share. The PE ratio reflects a fundamental relationship
between a company’s performance and its value (Cheng & Noland, 1995). The current share
price in the numerator is the market’s anticipation of the future earnings to be added from
prospective sales and can be obtained from the stock market at any transaction date. The
earnings per share in the denominator is the current earnings generated from the current sales
and can be obtained from the annual report or earnings announcement. For example, the
average trading share price for the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) in
Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) on 31 December 2013 was RMB4.10, and its audited earnings
per share as at 31 December 2013 was RMB0.68. Therefore, the PE ratio of ICBC at 31
December 2013 was 6.03.
The PE ratio expresses two different meanings for investors. It shows number of years
companies would take to earn the equivalent amounts that investors paid for the shares and
indicates average return rates based on a company’s current level of profits (Shirley et al.,
2012). In this example, the ICBC’s shares sold for 6.03 times its earnings and at the current
rate of earnings (RMB0.68), it shows that the ICBC would take about 6.03 years to earn the
equivalent of what an investor paid for the shares on 31 December 2013. In other words,
investors who purchased one share in the ICBC at a market price (RMB4.10) can expect to
earn an average return of 11% (RMB0.68/RMB4.10) at the current level of profit. The PE ratio
can be interpreted as a composite measure of investor’s hopes and fears (Wisniewski,
Lightfoot, & Lilley, 2012), and reflect the anticipated earnings growth of the company. If the
investors expect the company to have more future earnings than current earnings, the PE ratio
should be high, or if the investors expect lower future earnings than current earnings, the PE
ratio should be low. Moreover, the PE ratio is the most informative ratio when being applied
in cross-sectional analysis. The investors also can evaluate the earnings growth prospects and
risk by comparing a company’s PE ratio to the industry average.
On the other hand, the PE ratio is not without its limitations when applied in fundamental
analysis. First, it is difficult and expensive to collect accurate and reliable data from companies,
stock markets and government institutions, especially in some countries such as China and
India. The trends and indications derived from those estimated PE ratios might misdirect
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investors’ decision making. Second, the PE ratios may vary between industries and reflect a
strong relationship with the business life cycle. For example, financially strong, or ‘blue chip’
companies and companies experiencing substantial growth (e.g. internet business) may have
higher PE ratios while companies in mature or declining phases of the business life cycle tend
to have lower PE ratios. Last, the PE ratio reflects not so much the earnings generated by
companies, but more the prospects for future earnings. The bubble phenomenon in the late
1990s is a good example, the share prices of some dot com companies, particularly those with
meager earnings, were selling at levels that resulted in high PE ratios, and consequently
attracted a large number of irrational investors. Some observers expressed their concerns that
these PE ratios could only be sustained for a short period of time but not in the long run. As it
turned out the share prices of almost all dotcom companies subsequently crashed and investors
suffered losses. Although there are some limitations in relation to inaccurate data, different
business life cycles and certain economic phenomenon, the PE ratio is one of the more useful
investment ratios used in fundamental analysis of inefficient markets to identify mispriced
shares and guide investment decision making. It also reflects the level of confidence expressed
by investors in a company’s prospective earnings growth, and mirrors a fundamental
relationship between a company’s performance and its value. Thus, a falling PE ratio may
signal a need for impairment testing.

Summary
The literature shows that on average the market revises its expectations downward on the
announcement of goodwill impairment and the downward revision is related to the magnitude
of the impairment loss. Overall, the evidence suggests that the announcement of goodwill
impairment reveals negative information about the firm to the market (AbuGhazaleh et al.,
2012; Laghi et al., 2013; Li et al., 2011).

Research Questions and Method
The aim of the paper is to examine the extent of goodwill impairment in listed companies

of China and the extent of the audited disclosure of goodwill. To do this, the following

research questions are asked of the top 50 companies listed on the SSE:

1) How many SSE 50 companies recognise goodwill and what accounting policies are

disclosed to measure goodwill?
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2) How many SSE 50 companies have recognised goodwill impairment?
3) How many SSE 50 companies have suffered declining share price and price/earnings
ratios, and how many of those have recognized impairment?

Method
The present study covers the only listed companies in the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE). It
includes both government and private sector companies. The enterprises are chosen on the basis
of market capitalization. The top fifty corporate enterprises are considered because of their
size, SSE listing and because their accounting and market data are publicly available. The
period covered is centered around the year 2012 as it is considered a reasonably good year to
analyze goodwill due to number of acquisitions by Chinese companies. The data analysed from
annual reports of the companies involves the notes of goodwill in the financial statements,
minority interest, profit, auditors, earning per share and notes on account of goodwill.
By the end of 2012, there were 998 listed stocks on the SSE with a combined total market
capitalization of RMB 16 billion (US$2,645 billion), which accounted for over 30% of China’s
GDP in 2012. There are two types of tradable shares on the SSE: A-shares and B-shares. A-shares
are RMB denominated ordinary shares and sold to Chinese citizens and qualifying foreign
institutions. B-shares are US dollar denominated and sold to foreign investors. The A-shares
include state shares, legal entity shares, employee shares and public shares. The public shares
are freely tradable shares on the SSE and held by general investors. Since 1996, general investors
have been able to subscribe to new issues of public shares through a lottery mechanism (Wong
et al., 2006; Jiang & Leger, 2010).
All the share information of SSE 50 companies is based on the RMB denominated A-shares.
The share price and the earnings per share for the respective SSE 50 companies in 2011 and
2012 were gathered from the SSE website. The respective PE ratios in 2011 and 2012 were
calculated by using the share price divided by the earnings per share. In addition, the share
price as at June 2013 was also collected to calculate the estimated interim PE ratio as at June
2013 based on the earnings per share in 2012. All the financial and share market information
were incorporated in a spreadsheet for comparison and correlated analysis.

Findings
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The findings from the financial and share market information are presented below in relation
to the research questions that guided this study.
Research question one
How many SSE 50 companies recognise goodwill and what accounting policies are employed
to measure goodwill?
According to the collected financial information all companies show a minority interest in their
balance sheets as at 31 December 2012, while only 33 out of 50 companies (66%) were found
to have goodwill in their balance sheets as at 31 December 2012. This means 17 companies
had a minority interest but no goodwill. The explanation for this must be that goodwill has
been amortised to zero. Nonetheless, a note to this effect in the annual reports would have been
useful as it would be useful information for users. It is worth noting, in the light of this finding
that all the SSE 50 companies claim to have discontinued goodwill amortisation and adopted
goodwill impairment testing on annual basis.
The main impairment test method employed by the companies, that disclosed a method, is to
calculate the present value of the future cash flows in the next five years based on a market
discount rate and compare it with the carrying amount of goodwill then identify if there is any
impairment to be recognised. The policy adopted appears in notes to financial statement of the
annual report as exemplified in Table 1.
Table 1: The sample note in relation to goodwill
Code

Name

Auditor Note ref.

600585 Anhui Conch Cement KPMG
Company Limited

Notes

2(17)

No goodwill amortization.

2(18)

Annual goodwill impairment test.

5(15)

The cash generating amount from
goodwill

is based on the

present value of projected cash flow in the
next five years with pre-tax discount rate at
11.99%
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It is worth noting that discount rate adopted may affect the accuracy of the projected future
cash flow generated from goodwill, which may affect their testing and impairment recognition
(Wang, 2011). Although impairment testing has its disadvantages, the accounting policies
disclosed in notes to financial statements of the annual report in relation to goodwill
measurement support the view that the current set of accounting standards issued in China in
2006 has reached substantial convergence with IFRS (Zhang & Liu, 2010). On the other hand,
the remaining 17 companies (34%) not showing any goodwill balance as at 31 December 2012
in annual reports may indicate that the original goodwill has already been amortized or
impaired to zero in prior years. This conjecture reveals the uncertainty surrounding the
treatment of goodwill in the absence of any disclosure in the notes to the accounts.
Research question two
How many SSE 50 companies recognise goodwill impairment?
Among the 33 companies with a goodwill balance as at 31 December 2012, a total of nine
companies (18% of SSE 50) have disclosed some goodwill impairment, of which four
companies recognised the impairment in prior years and five companies made the impairment
in the current year of 2012. The information from the 9 companies is shown in Table 2 below.
Table 2: The sample note in relation to goodwill
Code

Name

Auditor

Goodwill impairment

Note

Prior year

Current Year

RMB

RMB

Referenc

Note

600028 Sinopec

KPMG

1,955m

-

(15)

No detail

600036 China Merchants

KPMG

-

579m

(19)

No detail

Bank
600104 SAIC Moto

Deloitte

2.9m

-

6(20)

No detail

600123 Shanxi Lanhua

Xinhua CPAs

-

21m

5(14)

Internal merger

600383 Gemdale Corp.

Deloitte

-

7.6m

6(12)

No detail

600999 China Merchants

Shingwing CPAs*

22.9m

-

(14)

No detail

Security
601318 Ping An Group

EY

-

48m

7(19)

No detail
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601818 China Everbright

KPMG*

4,738m

-

(19)

No detail

Bank
601899 Zijin Mining

EY

-

1.6m

5(16)

No detail

Table 2 above shows that seven out of nine companies (78%) were audited by Big Four firms
and the other two companies were audited by local firms. As more than half of the 33
companies that disclosed goodwill were audited by firms other that the Big Four, it may be
considered that companies audited by Big Four firms are more likely to impair goodwill. In
other words, of the 33 companies with goodwill for testing, 39% of those audited by Big Four
firms were impaired, while only13% of companies audited by smaller firms were impaired.
According to the notes to accounts in the annual report of China Merchants Security, goodwill
impairment amounted to RMB22.9 million, which came about from two loss making
businesses acquired by the company in August 2006 and June 2007 respectively. The account
notes reveal that both businesses were unable to generate superior returns from the original
recognised goodwill totaling RMB22.9 million based on current business operations. Therefore
the entire goodwill balance totaling RMB22.9 million was fully impaired. This finding also
supports the view that the companies should recognise an impairment loss when the companies
failed to realise the expected benefits from prior acquisitions (Kavcic et al., 2013).

However, generally among the SSE 50 companies there is inadequate disclosure on goodwill
testing and as the literature reveals, the quality of impairment reporting is lower where
regulatory and institutional infrastructure is weaker. A lack of adequate disclosure among the
nine companies that recognized impairment is revealed by the analysis. The relevant national
regulatory authorities should take appropriate enforcement actions to improve the quality of
impairment reporting (Graham, 2013).
Research question three
How many SSE 50 companies should have tested for possible goodwill impairment?
Table 3: Companies (24) that did not impair
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Name

Auditor Share price RMB

PE Ratio

2011

2012

2013'06

2011

2012

RMB Profit
201306 2011 (m)

Goodwill

2012 (m)

Change Amount (m)

CITIC Securities

EY

9.71

13.36

10.13

7.89

35.16

26.66

12,604

4,307

-65.8%

501

Anhui Conch Cement

KPMG
Fujian
Huaxing

15.65

18.45

13.38

7.15

15.50

11.24

11,824

6,462

-45.3%

212

29.67

38.35

26.70

19.78

49.81

34.68

1,493

881

-41.0%

16

China Pacific Insurance
Shanxi Lu An
Environmental

EY

19.21

22.50

15.93

19.80

38.14

27.00

8,393

5,130

-38.9%

962

BDO

21.16

21.78

11.96

12.67

19.45

10.68

3,339

2,050

-38.6%

133

SANY

RSM

12.54

10.57

7.51

11.00

14.09

10.01

9,361

6,011

-35.8%

41

Everbright Securities

BDO

10.20

14.10

10.20

22.67

48.62

35.17

1,595

1,033

-35.2%

233

Yang Quan Coal

BDO

15.18

14.16

9.04

12.97

14.91

9.52

2,711

2,246

-17.2%

51

Zhongjin Gold

RSM

17.51

16.63

9.29

18.24

31.38

17.53

2,490

2,087

-16.2%

643

PetroChina

PwC

9.74

9.04

7.61

13.34

14.35

12.08

146,007

130,618

-10.5%

7,582

Huatai Securities

Tianjian

7.82

9.80

8.06

24.44

33.79

27.79

1,821

1,661

-8.8%

51

HaiTong Securities

BDO

7.41

10.05

9.38

19.50

30.45

28.42

3,282

3,234

-1.4%

697

China Southern Railway

EY

4.33

4.96

3.60

13.12

16.53

12.00

4,743

4,852

2.3%

97

Guanghui Energy

20.58

16.39

12.96

40.35

58.54

46.29

963

985

2.3%

111

4.09

3.79

2.88

8.35

8.81

6.70

3,941

4,361

10.7%

350

Shan Dong Gold

Da Hua
Zhongtia
nyun
Beijing
Tianyuan

28.39

37.75

32.13

21.19

24.67

21.00

1,983

2,217

11.8%

665

China Northern Railway

KPMG

4.25

4.50

3.76

11.81

13.24

11.06

3,105

3,536

13.9%

14

ICBC

EY

4.24

4.10

4.02

7.07

6.03

5.91

208,445

238,691

14.5%

8,821

Bank of Communications

Deloitte

4.48

4.94

4.07

5.46

5.61

4.63

50,817

58,476

15.1%

322

China Construction

PwC

2.91

3.90

3.27

6.47

7.50

6.29

19,446

22,777

17.1%

1,917

Agricultural Bank of China Deloitte

2.62

2.80

2.46

6.89

6.22

5.47

121,956

145,131

19.0%

1,381

POLY Real Estate

BDO

10.00

13.60

9.91

9.09

11.53

8.40

7,367

9,979

35.4%

10

Industrial Bank

Deloitte

12.52

16.69

14.77

5.31

5.18

4.59

25,597

34,927

36.4%

446

Kangmei Pharmaceutical

GP CPAs

11.22

13.21

19.23

23.87

20.02

29.14

1,005

1,441

43.4%

170

Xiamen Tungsten

Sinohydro

The Table 3 above shows the 24 (out of 33) companies with goodwill balance as at 31
December 2012 that have not recognized any goodwill impairment for the year. Eleven of these
companies used Big Four audit firms, while the remainder (13) used second tier or local audit
firms. The share market and financial information of the 24 companies is shown above in terms
of share price, price/earnings trends, and goodwill. Although all the 24 companies should have
gone through impairment tests, 12 companies (50%) were found with decreased profit after tax

14

in 2012 compared with 2011 and 23 companies (96%) decreased their PE ratio and share price
as at June 2013 compared with 2012.
The decreases in share price, profit and PE ratios for 12 companies suggest that some
impairment of goodwill may be warranted to reflect the deteriorating financial performance
and declining confidence expressed by investors in relation to prospective earnings growth. For
example, Zhongin Gold’s share price fell from Y16.63 to Y9.29 and its PE ratio fell from 31.38
to 17.53 between 2012 and 2013. Xiamen Tungsten also reports drops in share price a d PE
ration from 2012 to 2013, while many of the companies in Table 4 that reported impairment
experienced smaller declines in share price and PE ratios. Of course, these indicators do not
tell the whole story but the analysis of trends do highlight the issue, particular when Zhongin
Gold and Xiamen Tungsten are audited by smaller local firms. Such trends would be consistent
with Li et al.’s (2011) study that found correlations between goodwill impairment and share
price, PE ratios and investor confidence. However, some companies may be reluctant to
recognise impairment because it would influence investor behavior and further bring down the
share price and PE ratios.
Table 4: Companies that impaired goodwill
Name
Sinopec
China Merchants
Bank
SAIC Moto
Sharui Lanhua Science
Gemdale Corporation
China Merchants
Securities
Ping An of China
China Everbright Bank
Zijin Mining

Auditor
KPMG
KPMG
Deloitte
Xinghua
CPA
Deloitte
Shinwing
CPA
EY
KPMG
EY

RMB Share Price
2011
7.18

Goodwill

Impt

Amount Amounts
(RMBm)
(RMBm)
6,257
1,955

2013
4.18

2011
8.65

2012
9.32

2013
5.73

11.47 13.75 11.6
14.14 17.1 13.21

7.11
7.73

6.55
9.1

5.52
7.03

9,598
85

579
3

12 20.36 12.37
6.86 7.39 8.87

7.7
5.03

174
8

21
8

10.18 10.55 10.4 23.67 10.14 29.71
14.44 45.29 34.76 13.78 17.9 13.74
2.88 3.05 2.85 6.45
5.2 4.98
1.82 3.83 2.39 14.69 15.96 9.96

10
11,769
1,281
497

23
48
4,718
2

30.44
4.95

2012
6.8

PE Ratio

20.1
6.74

Table 4 shows that as at June 2013, the share price and PE ratio decreased for companies, which
disclosed goodwill impairment in 2012. This could mean that impairment once announced
pushes a share price slide further, or it could be that the share price and PE ratio merely reflects
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the need for impairment. Either way, it supports the conclusion that PE ratios can reflect
investors' hopes and fears (Wisniewski et al., 2012) and that market information spreads very
quickly and is incorporated into the share prices (Malkiel, 2003). On the other hand, some
companies may exert greater influence over the local audit firms to maintain their earnings per
share at a satisfactory level without taking any goodwill impairment in order to affect investor
behavior and prevent share prices sliding further (Basi & Penning, 2002). The latter could apply
to companies like Zhongin Gold and Xiamen Tungsten.

Conclusion and suggestions for future research
The paper investigates goodwill recognition and measurement in SSE 50 companies in China,
and suggests a correlation between SSE 50 companies, their auditors and impairment. It also
explores the linkage between goodwill impairment and share market information. First, all SSE
50 companies have discontinued goodwill amortization and adopted goodwill impairment
testing which is in line with IFRS and with the literature in relation to goodwill amortization
versus goodwill impairment. Second, it appears from the literature and from this investigation
that the Big Four auditors are in a stronger position to drive SSE 50 companies to recognise or
disclose goodwill impairment based on changes in operational earnings, financial performance
and investor confidence. Third, and perhaps most importantly these SSE 50 companies disclose
very little information around goodwill in their notes to accounts.
The findings of this study point to some interesting topics for future research. First, most SSE
50 companies disclosed goodwill impairment losses in annual reports without providing any
explanations in the notes. Future research could therefore examine the circumstances by which
goodwill impairment is recognized in Chinese listed companies with particular emphasis on
size and reputation of the audit firm engaged by company. This last point is of significance
because from this preliminary investigation it would seem that small local audit firms are more
beholden to their clients and less likely to push for recognition of impairment. The paper is
inconclusive as to whether declining share price and PE ratios drive are a cause or an effect of
impairment or both.
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